1st July: Premature Detonation at Serre and Beaumont Hamel
Stand on the top of the Hawthorn Ridge today and you can see for miles. Its tactical value during the First World War is still obvious – the German defenders positioned within the Redoubt (strong point) perched on top of the ridge would have had an uninhibited view across No Man’s Land and down to the British positions dug into the valley. It was machine-gunning heaven, and this danger was not lost on the top man of the British VIII Corps, Lieutenant-General Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston and his staff, which is why his men went to so much trouble to dig under Hawthorn Ridge, pack it full of high explosives and blast the position out of existence.
The importance of the ridge was also front-and-centre in the thoughts of the German defenders. Not only would they lose a delightful view if they got kicked off the ridge, it would also expose their forward artillery lines and render their grip on the nearby villages of Beaumont-Hamel, Beaucourt, Thiepval, Grandcourt and Miraumont sketchy to say the least. Not surprisingly then, the German commander in the region, Generalleutnant Franz Freiherr von Soden, spared no effort in beefing up the defences of his lines.
Once the Hawthorn Redoubt had ceased to exist, Hunter-Weston’s plan was to breach the German lines with a full-frontal infantry attack using three full divisions which were to push on through the enemy defences to a depth of around 3,000 yards before all linking arms on their final objective: the Serre-Grandcourt Spur.
The most northerly division in the attack was to be the 31st Division – made up largely of Pals Battalions from the north of England - who would capture Serre before moving on to the high ground beyond. Immediately to their south, the 4th Division would attack up the Redan Ridge, smashing up the Redan Redoubt, the Heidenkopf Redoubt, and the Soden Redoubt before linking up with their chums from 31st Division. Finally, the 29th Division was to capture Beaumont-Hamel, Y-Ravine, Grallsburg, Beaucourt Redoubt and Beaucourt village before arriving at the southern edge of the Serre-Grandcourt Spur.
The infantry would be backed up by the chaps of VIII Corp Artillery who had three primary tasks. In no particular order, these were to smash the German defensive line to bits, including machine-gun posts, trenches, and barbed wire entanglements; account for as many infantry casualties as possible and neutralise enemy artillery batteries.
A lot of this work was carried out during the Great Bombardment – VIII Corps artillery lobbed almost 363,000 shells onto German positions between 24th - 30th June. On 1st July they fired another 61,500. These were impressive numbers – impressive enough to convince Hunter-Weston that his men simply had to just ‘walk into Serre’.
Regardless of the mighty artillery support, this was an ambitious plan. Some would call it highly optimistic; others might call it highly stupid. But the plan was approved by Brigadier-General John Charteris (General Sir Douglas Haig’s Chief of Intelligence) on 28th June. As far as Hunter-Weston was concerned, it was all systems go.
The task handed out to 4th and 29th Divisions was especially daunting. They were being asked to carry the advance straight into a natural amphitheatre towards Beaumont Hamel and then climb up onto the Beaucourt Spur towards the enemy’s second line of defence. The key to success here was the 40,000Ibs of explosives sitting under the Hawthorn Redoubt, just in front of Beaumont Hamel on the 29th Divisional front. But the discussion regarding the best time to blow the mine had been going on for weeks and was contentious to say the least.
After much back and forth, a compromise was arrived at where the mine was to be blown at 7.20am - ten minutes before the main attack at. It was a time that very few of Hunter-Weston’s staff agreed with and senior artillery leaders tried in vain to get him to change his mind, but the General was unmoved.
To add insult to injury, Hunter-Weston also fiddled with the artillery timetable to accommodate the mine blast. He wanted to ensure the men racing to the Hawthorn crater were not smashed up by their own artillery – this, everyone must agree, was frightfully sensible, however instead of just ordering the artillery in the Hawthorn Ridge sector to lift at 7.20am and target the German rear lines, he ordered all his heavy artillery across his entire front to lift. As it turned out, this decision wasn’t quite as sensible.
Even before the dust had settled on the massive mine-crater now in place of the Hawthorn Redoubt, German forces in rear positions rushed forwards to occupy the lip of the crater nearest to them, just as two companies of Royal Fusiliers were crossing No Man’s Land to occupy the other side of the crater lip. Unfortunately for the British, the Germans got there first and directed withering machine-gun fire onto the advancing men, making it very difficult, if not impossible, for the British men to capture the entire crater as planned.
As the British artillery switched their attack to the German rear lines as per their direction, the leading waves of Pals from the 31st Division moved up to as close to the German wire as they dared, here they lay down ready to rush the enemy lines as soon as the whistles blew. It was at about this time that the men in these lead battalions realised that their artillery cover had all but disappeared – one soldier from the Durham Pals stole a quick peek out towards the enemy positions:
Out on the top (of the trench) came scrambling a German machine-gun team. They fixed their gun in front of their parapet and opened out a slow and deadly fire on our front.
Within minutes, heavy machine-gun fire was ripping through the men lying out in No Man’s Land. It was not even Zero Hour, and the first waves of the attack were already getting cut to pieces. One battalion had no functioning officers by 7.28am., two minutes before the official start of the attack.
When the whistles did finally blow at 7.30am, those men who had not yet been hit stood up and moved off towards the German lines, only to find their path obstructed by enemy wire which had not, despite all the promises, been cut. Musketier Karl Blenk watched the attack unfold from his defensive position and later recollected:
When the English started advancing, we were very worried; they looked as if they must overrun our trenches. We were very surprised to see them walking, we had never seen that before… When we started firing, we just had to load and reload. They went down in their hundreds. You didn’t have to aim, we just fired into them. If only they had run, they would have overwhelmed us.
The men making up the second and third waves of the attack fared little better. As well as murderous machine gun fire, the Germans were also dropping a fantastic artillery barrage onto the British front line and assembly areas to the rear.
The result was carnage, with many units simply wiped out before they had even reached their own front line. Those that got over the parapet had a very similar experience to the men of the 12th York & Lancasters (Sheffield Pals) who found that:
They had to pass through a terrible curtain of shell fire, and German machine guns were rattling death from two sides. But the lines growing ever thinner, went on unwavering. Here and there a shell would burst right among the attackers… Whole sections were destroyed; one section of 14 platoon was killed by concussion, all the men falling to the ground without a murmur. The left half of ‘C’ Company was wiped out before getting near the German wire…
The third and fourth wave suffered so heavily that by the time they reached No Man’s Land they had lost at least half their strength… The few survivors took shelter in shell-holes in front of the German line and remained there until they could get back under cover of darkness.
Despite the odds, pockets of men did manage to get through the German wire and into the enemy front-line trenches and even on towards Serre itself, however the Germans quickly closed in on these isolated groups, cutting off all escape routes and quickly snuffing out any danger. By noon, VIII Corps leaders had issued an order to cease any further attempts at attack and put all energies into consolidating the current front line in case of German counter-attack.
The fate of the 31st Division is one of the most tragic stories from a day full of tragedy. The ifs, buts and maybes of Hunter-Weston’s decisions regarding the timing of the mine and the lifting of the barrage will rage on in perpetuity.
What is undeniable is that, through no fault of their own, the men of the 31st Division suffered over 3,500 casualties and gained zero objectives.
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